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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

A. J. Lil\fB, dba Lil\IB REALTY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
VS.

FEDERATED.MILK PHODUCERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., FEDERATED DAIRY FARMS, INC., and
KENNETH T. ALLRED,

Case No.
11543

Defendants and Respondents

Brief of Defendants-Respondents

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The case below was disposed of upon the making
of Motions by both parties for Summary Judgment by
the entry of a Judgment in favor of Defendants-Respondents granting their Motion for Summary J udgment and denying the Plaintiff's motion for Summary
Judgment. The Plaintiff appeals.
I
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents, hereinafter referred to
as the respondent, seeks to have the Summary J udgment sustained.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The Respondent agrees in general with the statement of facts set forth by the Plaintiff-Appellant, hereinafter referred to as Appellant, but disagrees with
several statements which appear to be argument or at
least stated in less than a true factual manner. The
statement that the Appellant " ... (b) began to negotiate with ... Sears ... " (Appellant's brief, page 2)
is perhaps a key question in this action and is not an
admitted fact. Likewise the question of oral recision
of Appellant's letter of authority is not precisely as set
forth by Appellant on page 3 of his brief. Therefore,
a short statement of fact will be set forth here with
appropriate citations to the record and the depositions.
Some time prior to October 25, 1963, John Williamson, a real estate salesman employed by Limb
Realty, the Plaintiff herein, contacted Federated Dairy
Farms, Inc., one of the defendants, by means of a call
upon Kenneth T. Allred, an employee of Federated.
The purpose of this meeting was to see if the property
at 723 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, owned
by Federated was for sale. This meeting probably took
place approximately the 14th of October, 1963 ('Villiamson deposition, P. 4L 9-13).

2
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After some preliminary discussions, .Mr. Allred
delivered to .l\lr. \Villiamson a letter dated October
25, 1963, which is attached to the complaint as .Exhibit
''A'', (R-2) which provided an authorization for )lr.
'Villiamson to negotiate with clients for the purchase
of the property at 723 South State Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah, and specifically listed, among other parties,
Sears, Roebuck and Company as being one with whom
.OMr. Williamson had authority to deal.
After receiving the letter, l\lr. \Villiamson and his
broker, the Appellant Limb, claim to have set up a meeting with some representatives of Sears, Roebuck and
Company. This meeting was held during the first half
of November, 1963, (Limb deposition P. 19 L. 28-30).
At the termination of that meeting, it was concluded
that there wasn't any interest on behalf of Sears, Roebuck and Company (Limb deposition P. 18 L. 6-9).
After that initial meeting, .l\lr. Limb on perhaps
one occasion in December of 1963, stopped in briefly
to talk with one of the representatives of Sears, Roebuck and Company and again was told that he didn't
think Sears was interested in the property (Limb depoposition P. 20 L. 3-15), and had another contact with
Sears, again a brief conversation when he stopped into
the store, after the first of the year of 1964 (Limb
deposition P. 20 L. 23). There was possibly one additional conversation in which Mr. Limb discussed the
mater with somebody from Sears, and that was in April
or .l\lay of 1964 (Limb deposition P. 23 L. 30; P. 24
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L. 1-3). Except for the first meeting at which it is
alleged a presentation was made, and which was approximately 45 minutes to one hour in length, the other
meetings were approximately four or five minutes long
and totalled approximate!):' three or four contacts at
most (Limb deposition P. 24, L. 16-24) and after April
or May of 1964 Limb had no further contact with anybody from Sears, Roebuck in regard to the purchase
of the subject property (Limb deposition P. 24 L.
25-38) and Williamson had no further contact with
anybody from Sears in regard to the purchase of the
property after January 1, 1964 (\Villiamson deposition, P. 21 L. 26-29). (On page 21 at Line 11, the question was "So it would be before the first of the year,
before 1965 ?", which was an error in that the date
should have been before "1964.")
Thus, insofar as \Villiamson was concerned, there
was no contact with Sears by him in an attempt to sell
the property after the end of the year 1963 and there
was no contact by Limb after April or May of 1964.
On April 27, 1964, letters of termination of any
authority granted John \Villiamson under the letter
sued on in the case at bar as well as letters of termination to several other people who had been given
identical limited authority in relation to selling the
property to other prospective clients were sent at the
direction of Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., (R-38).
The wrong address was used for the one sent to Mr.
\Villiamson, according to 'Villirunson's affidavit on
4
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file herein and his deposition; however, it is undisputed
that an attempt at formal termination had been made
and according to the affidavit of D. Howe .Moffat
( H-38), had it been known that any further claim
was being made by \Villiamson or A. J. Limb, additional action would have been taken to terminate \\Tilliamson's authority or the ultimate sale finally entered
into would not have been made.
In addition, a phone call was made by Mr. Allred,
the Respondent's employee who had signed the letter
which the appellant relies upon to l\Ir. \Villiamson,
the Appellant's admitted agent and the person to whom
the letter of October 25, 1963, was addressed advising
him that a letter of recision was being mailed and if
he had any prospects he should let Allred know before
the property was listed with \\T allace-McConoughy.
(Allred deposition P. 16 L. 25-30, P. 17 L. 1-2).
\Villiamson's reply to this was that there was no further
interest and to go ahead and list the property-that
he was through with it. (Allred deposition P. 17 L.
3-4, an dL. 29-30, P. 18 L. 1-3) \Villiamson does not
deny this phone call but does state he can't recall it
and, therefore, doesn't believe it was made. (\Villiamson deposition P. 28 L. 22-30, P. 29, L. 1-20)
The property was listed .May 22, 1964, with \Vallace-1\'lcConaughy and in May of 1964 a large sign
approximately IO' x 12' was painted on the fence immediately to the south of the gate facing State Street.
This sign was approximately directly across the street

5
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from the existing Sears, Roebuck building. The sign
held the property out for sale and had the name of
the realtors, 'V allace-.McConaughy, in large conspicuous letter as the realtors to contact. (R-31)
The property was sold in April of 1966, through
'Vallace-1\ilcConaughy and a full commission was paid
upon said sale. It was thereafter that Williamson and
Limb pressed their claim for a commission based upon
the letter of October 25, 1963.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
The Respondents were entitled to Summary J udgment and the same should be sustained by this court
on the grounds that the letter of October 25, 1963, was
(a) terminated by operation of law; and (b) without
consideration.
POINT II
The Appellant is estopped to recover a commission
upon at least three grounds.
POINT III
The relief requested by the Appellant cannot be
granted because all of the defenses of Respondents
have not been ruled upon.
6
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE RESPONDENTS \\'EHE
ENTITLED TO SUl\IMARY JUDGMEXT
AND THE SAl\IE SHOULD llE SUSTAINED
llY THIS COURT ON THE GROUNDS TH.AT
THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 25, 1963,
AS
(a)
TER.MINATED BY OPERATION OF
LA,V; AND (b) 'VITHOUT CONSIDERATION.

"r

A. The lett.er of October 25, 1963, was terminated
by law.
The letter upon which the action is based and
which is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A"
( R-2) does not provide for any expiration nor for any
period of time in which it will remain valid. The rule of
law is as set forth in 12 Am. Jur., 2d, Brokers, Section
54 at P. 813, where it states as follows:
"'Vhere the contract is silent as to its duration, the rule generally followed, with some
authority to the contrary, is that the broker is
deemed to be given only a reasonable time within
which to accomplish the object of his agency."
Although Am. J ur. states that what is a reasonable
time is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of
each case, and is ordinarily a question of fact, it further
states this is not true if the evidence is susceptible of
only one reasonable inference in that respect. To the
same effect, see 25 ALR at 1555, where it is stated
that what is a reasonable time is a question of law
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at least where the facts are not in dispute and some
cases hold it is a question of law regardless of a dispute
of fact, citing Coquyt vs. Shower, 68 Colo. 89, 189,
Pac. 606.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that there
transpired 30 months from the date of the letter of
October 25, 1963, to the date of the sale by others, and
that there transpired at least 23 months from the time
that either 'Villiamson or Limb had any contact whatsoever with Sears, Roebuck in regard to the purchase
of the property until it was sold by others.
In Appellant's second point, it is contended, if the
discussion is analyzed, that it would make no difference
how long a period of time elapsed from the time that
the Plaintiff last made any effort to sell the property
until the time it was actually sold, and that regardless
of the time being one year or 100 years, he would be
entitled to a commission even though he had in effect
abandoned the contract. It is submitted that the cases
herein clearly support the fact that an agreement without date terminates in a reasonable length of time and
to hold otherwise would clearly do violence to the orderly conducting of business.
It is submitted that under the undisputed facts
contained herein and the law as cited above, the Appellant had more than reasonable time in which to sell
the property; in fact, did not do so, and the letter of
authority had terminated by operation of law.

8
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Il. The letter of October :25, 1963, is without con-

sideration.
The letter of October 25, 1963, was a unilateral
off er to pay a commission upon sale of property an<l
was not supported by consideration. The consideration
for such an agreement is the procuring by the broker
of a ready, willing and able buyer which, Ly admission
of the facts in the instant case, did not occur through
the efforts of the Appellant or his employee, \Villiamson.
See Flinders vs. Hunt.er, 60 Utah 314, 208 Pac.
526, 28 ALR 886 ( 1922). In this case, a document
was delivered by the seller to the broker which promised
a five per cent sales commission if the property was
sold, and as in the case at bar, there was no termination
date upon the agreement. The language regarding consideration was as follows:
"For and in consideration of $1.00, the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, I hereby appaint Fred Flinders Company exclusive agent
to make
sale of the property above described
,,
Upon a trial the Court found that in fact the
agreement was not supported by consideration and that
the Defendant had a right to terminate the agreement
at any time because the agreement was not supported
by consideration and did not bind the Defendant.
On appeal, this court supported this proposition
and quoted as follows from Mecham on Agency, First
Ed. Sec. 207, as follows:
9
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"Thus, where one is given authority to sell
the lands or other property of another and is
to have a certain commission or share out of
the proceeds for making the sale, the authority
may be revoked at the will of the principal even
though in terms it was declared to be exclusive
or irrevocable . . . The interest in the commissions to be earned and in the moneys expended
in endeavoring to carry out the agency is not
sufficient to prevent revocation."
In the case at bar, the writing given to 'Villiamson
does not recite any consideration running from 'Villiamson to Respondent as does the agreement in the Flinders
case and there is no allegation of consideration contained in Appellant's complaint.
In Flinders vs. Hunter, supra, this Court quotes
with favor as follows:
"In a note following the decision in Paschall
vs. Gilliss, Ann. Cas. 1913E, at page 788, the
writer of the note, under the subject 'N egotiations with Broker Terminated,' states his conclusions from the decision thus: "Although the
broker may be the means of first bringing the
parties together and of opening negotiations with
them, yet if the negotiations are unproductive
and the parties in good faith withdraw therefrom
and abandon the proposed purchase and sale,
a subsequent renewal of negotiations followed
by a sale at a less price does not entitle the broker
to the commissions, as he cannot be said to be
the procuring cause of the sale".
''In view, however, that the Court further
found that the plaintiff was not the procuring

10
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case of the sale in question and that it 'l:t'<M
effectuated solely throuyh the efforts of the defendant, plaintiff' is in 1w event entitled to recm·er a com mission. 'Po that effect are all t}1e
mdlwrities." (emphasis added).
That the Appellant was not the procuring cause,
or in fact had any effect whatsoever in the case at bar,
see the Affidavit of :Michael B. Kauffman. l\Ir. Kauffman, at the time of the purchase was manager of the
Salt Lake City Sear' s store, says as follows in the undisputed Affidavit which must be taken as true:
" ... that during said period of time (that ne·
gotiations with \Vallace-:\lcConaughy were being conducted) he personally conducted said negotiations; that he has never had any contact
with A. J. Limb or John \Villiamson in relation
to said purchase and at the time of negotiating
for the purchase of said property, he was not
aware of any prior contact made by either A. J.
Limb or John 'Villiamson with Sears-Roebuck
and Company and any such contact which said
parties may have had had no effect upon the
negotiations for the purchase of the property
in April, 1966, and in no way effected or influenced the said negotiations which ultimately
lead to the purchase of the property by SearsRoebuck and Company." (R34-35).

It, therefore, becomes apparent in the case at bar
by the uncontroverted facts found in the pleadings and
the depositions that (I) the Appellant never presented
to Federated any buyer ready, willing and able to
purchase the property (Limb deposition P. 42L. 2530) and as noted above, there was no attempt on the

11
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part of the Appellant or any of his employees to sell
the property to Sears after, at latest, l\1ay of 1964,
which was only the last of approximately three contacts
where inquiry was made as to whether there was any
interest, which contacts were very short conversations
of only four or five minutes each. There was only one
attempt, according to the Appellant and his salesman
where the property was ever specifically mentioned as
being for sale and that was in November of 1963 and
there were, in fact, no actual sales efforts thereafter.
In that meeting, the only one upon which the Appellant relies, according to the affidavit of l\lr. Johnson,
the subject property was only one of several that were
mentioned and the Appellant was told at that time that
Sears-Roebuck and Company was not interested in the
purchase of the property. As a matter of fact, said affidavit states in part as follows:
"The only discussion had concerning the property located at 725 (723) South State Street
was that Mr. Limb stated that he had a listing
on said property. In response to this statement
it was stated that Sears-Roebuck and Company
was not interested in the purchase of the property as it was located across the street from
Sears-Roebuck and Company location." ( emphasis added) ( R-81 )
The Appellant fails specifically to note that the
agreement uses the word '''negotiate" as follows: "This
is to authorize you to negotiate with clients for the purchase of 732 South State Street ..." The word is again

12
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used in paragraph 3 where it states as follows: '' ...
You are only authorized to negotiate with the following
persons . . . " Now, it may be a play on words, but
there has not been a single claim by the Appellant that
they ever negotiated for the purchase of the property.
\Vebster's 'l".hird New International Dictionary
Unabridged ( 1961) defines the word negotiate in the
sense that it would apply to the matter at bar as follows:
''to communicate or confer with another so as
to arrive at the settlement of some matter; meet
with another so as to arrive through discussion
at some kind of agreement or compromise about
something; come to terms esp. in state matters
by meetings and discussions . . . ; to carry on
business or trade ... ; to deal with (some matter
or affair that requires ability for its successful
handling); MANAGE, HANDLE, CONDUCT . . . ; to arrange for or bring about
through conference and discussion; work out or
arrive at or settle upon by meetings and agreements and compromises . . . ; to encounter and
dispose of (as a problem, challenge) with completeness and satisfaction; tackle unsuccessfully
... ; COMPLETE, ACCOMPLISH."
It becomes apparent even from the depositions of
the Appellant and Mr. Williamson that there were
never any "negotiations" and according to Mr. Johnson' s Affidavit (R-81) the most that can be said that
was ever done in relation to Sears-Roebuck was a meeting at which Limb told the representatives of SearsRoebuck that he had the subject property as well as
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other properties listed for sale, at which time he was
told that Sears was not interested in the property. The
sole claim made by Appellant is that a meeting was
held with Mr. Johnson and .l\ir. Jenkins at SearsRoebuck at which the property was mentioned. There
was not even a claim that this was the only property
mentioned but only a claim that this property was, in
fact, mentioned.
In reading the contract which must be construed
as a whole, it would appear that the contract clearly
contemplates that at the very least, some actual negotiations regarding the purchase of the property must
be undertaken and by the depositions of the Appellant
Limb and his agent Williamson, it is clear that at no
time did Sears-Roebuck ever evidence an interest in
the property nor were there any negotiations for the
purchase of the property in the sense that the parties
attempted to put a sale together.
As the term "negotiation" is defined in both com·
mon usage and by Webster's Dictionary as set forth
above, it becomes very clear that "negotiation" involves
communication and conference in an attempt to arrive
at some kind of an agreement, compromise or to bring
something about. There is no claim by the Appellant
that the terms of any proposed purchase were discussed
such as price, the date of occupancy, the method by
which the purchase price was to be paid, the details
of the ground including whether any rights of way or
easements were connected with it, whether there was

14
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any outstan<ling obligation against it, or any other
of the myriad details that are ordinarily and necessarily
discussed when a person is "negotiating" for the sale
or purchase of real property.
Under the circumstances, it is respectfully urged
that the letter of October 25, 1963, was without consideration and in addition thereto, the Appellant not
only not having been the actual procuring cause of thG
sale or havonig had any effect on the sale to the ultimate
purchaser, but also not having negotiated for th~
sale, he is not entitled to any commission.
POINT II. THE APPELLANTS IS ESTOP.
PED TO RECOVER A COMMISSION UPON
AT LEAST THREE GROUNDS.
On May 2, 1964, after the Appellant had ceased
any further activities in an attempt to sell the property,
a listing of the subject property was made with 'Vallace-.McConaughy, a real estate sales organization in
Salt Lake City, Utah. On May 14, 1964, a large sign
approximately 10' x 12' located on the fence to the
south of the gate facing State Street and across State
Street from Sears, Roebuck was painted showing the
dimensions of the property, holding it out for sale and
it contained the name of ''W allace-McConaughy" in
large conspicuous letters as the realtor offering the
property. (R-31-32)
The Appellant admits in his deposition (Limb deposition, P. 30 L. 2) that he saw that sign and although
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he cannot recall the exact date, he thinks it was in the
end of 1964 and he further admits that he saw the name
"Wallace-McConaughy ., on the sign as being the listing
agent (Limb deposition P. 30 L. 10-12), and it is
further admitted by Mr. Limb that he saw the sign
after he had his last contact with Sears, Roebuck (Limb
deposition P. 30 L. 21-25). Mr. \Villiamson, Limb's
employee, also admits having seen the sign and that
it had the name "Wallace-.McConaughy" as the real tor
or broker on it (Williamson deposition P. 31 L. 1418). Mr. Williamson also indicates that he discussed
this matter with Mr. Limb at the time that he first
became aware of the fact that the property was listed
with another broker (Williamson deposition P. 30 L.
24-30; and P. 31 L. 1-13) and yet neither the Appellant
nor his employee, after having become aware of the
fact the property was being held out for sale by other
parties and discussing the matter, made any contact
with Federated, the seller, Wallace-McConaughy, the
realtor involved, or Sears, Roebuck and Company
(Limb deposition P. 31 L. 3; Williamson deposition
P. 37 L. 13-30; P. 38 L. 1-13). Mr. Williamson even
admits that in his reading the sign with Wallace-McConaughy' s name on it ,it would ordinarily have lead
him to believe if Wallace McConaughy sold the property a commission would be paid to Wallace McConaughy (Williamson deposition P. 38 L. 25-28).
In September of 1965 demolition of the building
on the property was started at the direction of Fede-
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rated Dairy Farms, Inc., and demolition was completed
in November of 1965 ( R-33) . Both Limb and \V illiamson admit in their depositions that they observed the
demolition of the building ( \Villiamson deposition P.
32 L. 15-18; Limb deposition P. 31 L. 12-18) and
both parties admit that they again made no inquiry
of anyone from Federated in regard to the demolition
of the building and as to whether or not it would change
any of the provisions of sale or whether it had in fact
been sold (Limb deposition P. 32 L. 9-12; L. 18-20;
Williamson deposition P. 33 L. 10-21).
It is admitted by \V"illiamson, the agent of the
Appellant, Limb, that the fact that the building was
taken off the property would have some effect upon
the value of the property either increasing or decreasing
the value, depending upon the desire of the purchasers
(\Villiamson deposition P. 33 L. 27-30; and in particular lines 20-22) and yet it is admitted as noted
above that no inquiry was made by either Williamson
or Limb of anybody, even though they had seen the
sign on the property holding it out for sale by another
broker, had discussed the matter between themselves,
(\Villiamson even had told Allred the property would
be easier to sell if the building were removed). (Williamson deposition P. 33 L. 3-6) and had seen the
demolition of the building on the property. This in spite
of the fact that it is admitted that in the ordinary
course of events the realtor who lists the property
would be expected to receive a commission and that
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the demolition on the property would change its value
in one way or another to any prospective purchaser
and would make it easier to sell the property according
to 'Villiamson. In other words, with a sign on the
property from l\lay of 1964 until the sale of the property
in April, 1966, a period of 23 months, and with the
building having been removed from the property by
the end of November of 1965, a period of five months
prior to the sale, still the Appellant and his agent made
no contact with Federated in particular, or anybody
for that matter, to note that they still claimed some
interest in the sale of the property.
Under the circumstances, it is respectfully urged
that the Appellant is estopped from claiming any comm1ss1on. In 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver,
Section 35 (p. 640), estoppel in its broadest sense is
set forth as follows:
"Broadly speaking, the essential elements of
an equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, as related to the party to be estopped, are: ( 1) conduct which amounts to a false representation
or concealment of material facts, or, at least,
which is calculated to convey the impression that
the facts are otherwise, than, and inconsistent
with, those which the party subsequently attempts
to assert; ( 2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon
by, or influence, the other party or other persons;
and ( 3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of
the real facts. And, broadly speaking, as related
to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential
elements are ( 1) lack of knowledge and of the
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means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts
in question; ( 2) reliance, in good faith, upon the
conduct or statements of the party to be estoppe<l; aud ( 3) action or inaction based thereon
of such a character as to change the position or
status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his
injury, detriment, or prejudice ...
"Equitable estoppel arises from the conduct
of a party, using the word 'conduct' in its broadest meaning as including his spoken words, his
positive acts, and his silence when there is a duty
to speak ,and proceeds on the consideration that
the author of a misfortune shall not himself
escape the consequences and cast the burden on
another. Accordingly, it holds a person to a
representation made or a position assumed where
otherwise inequitable consequences would result
to another who, having the right to do so, under
all the circumstances of the case, has in good
faith relied thereon and been misled, to his in-

.

JUry.

"

Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Sec. 53 p.
665) , discusses estoppel by silence or inaction and says
as follows:
28

"The authorities make it abundantly clear that
an estoppel may arise under certain circumstances from silence or inaction as well as from
words or actions. Estoppel by silence or inaction
is often referred to as estoppel by 'standing by,'
and that phrase in this connection has almost
lost its primary significance of actual presence
or participation in the transaction and generally
covers any silence where there are knowledge
and a duty to make a disclosure. The principle
underlying such estoppels is embodied in the
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maxim 'one who is silent when he ought to speak
will not be heard to speak when he ought to be
silent.' Silence, when there is a duty to speak,
is deemed equivalent to concealment ..Moreover,
there are cases where the mere silence of the
estopped party and his failure to assert the right
later claimed will be construed as a representation that he do(IS not have the right which he
later attempts to assert ....
"In general, a person is required to speak only
when common honesty and fair dealing demands
that he do so, and in order that a party may be
estopped by silence, there must be on his part
an intent to mislead, or at least a willingness that
others should be deceived, together with knowledge or reason to suppose that someone is relying on such silence or inaction and in consequence thereof is acting or is about to act as he
would not act otherwise."
The following discussion in 28 Am. J ur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Section 58 (p. 675) sets forth an
estoppel by delay, which perhaps is closely related to
the question discussed in the first point of this brief
to-wit: the failure to perform within a reasonable length
of time and says as follows:
"Estoppel by delay is closely related to, and
perhaps should be included in, estoppel by silence
or inaction. It is also closely related to estoppel
by acquiescence, since delay in the assertion of
rights or in the raising of objections is often an
indication of acquiescence.
"Although a slight delay is less likely than
a more extended one to be considered a ground
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of estoppel, the questions whether a delay is
such as to give rise to an estoppel can never be
determined merely by measuring the length of
the delay in days or months or years, since what
would be inexcusable delay in one case might
not be inconsistent with diligence in another. In
other words, while delay may, when associated
with other essential conditions, be an element
in, or a basis for, estoppel, as indicating an intention to abandon rights or a negligent failure to
assert them, there is no necessary estoppel arising from the mere lapse of time alone.
"As long as parties are in the same condition,
it matters little whether one presses a right
promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law;
but when, knowing his rights, he takes no step
to enforce them until the condition of the other
party has, in good faith, become so changed that
he cannot be restored to his farmer state, if the
right is then enforced, delay becomes inequitable
and operates as an estoppel against the assertion
of the right.
And 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Section 61 (p. 683) in discussing estoppel by negligence
where there is no requirement or intention on the part
of the person to be estopped states as follows:
''Negligence, generally. The statement has
been made that the doctrine of estoppel is usually
applied to cases where the party sought to be
estopped was guilty of some negligence or lack
of diligence, under the principle that if he is
guilty thereof he must take the consequences
of his own acts which mislead others to act to
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their injury. Although an intention to influence
the conduct of another is ordinarily essential
to the creation of an equitable estoppel, it has
been held in many cases that estoppel may arise,
even in the absence of any intention of this
character, from the culpable negligence of one
party by which another has been mislead. Thus,
an equitable estoppel may arise when one through
culpable negligence induces another to believe
certain facts to exist, and such other rightfully
relies and acts on such belief."
In relation to the last quote from Am. J ur., Williamson, whois the admitted agent of the Appellant,
admits at P. 41 L. 10-13 of his deposition that he not
only didn't contact },ederated but that perhaps he
should have as follows:
Q. \Vhy didn't you contact Federated or Mr.
Allred and advise him of your feelings in
regard to this matter?" (relating to the listing with \Vallace-McConaughy)

A. I can't answer that. I would have to stay that
perhaps this should have been done but it
wasn't." (emphasis added)
A leading case in Utah on Estoppel is Kelly vs.
Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P2d 731, 129 ALR 164
( 1938), where it is said in regard to estoppel as follows:
"It is elementary that as a matter of pleading
an estoppel in pais exists only when facts are
alleged which show that one person has by his
words, deeds, or conduct so behaved that another
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person in good faith relying upon such conduct
has been intentionally led thereby to change his
position for the worse and who would not so have
changed his position except for the conduct of
the other party.
"This estoppel ar~ses when one by his acts,
representations, or admissions, or by his silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or
through cupable negligence induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted
to deny the existence of such facts. It consists
in holding for the truth a representation acted
upon, when the person who made it, or his privies,
seek to deny its truth, and to deprive the party
who has acted upon it of the benefit obtained.
21 Corpus Juris, P. lll3, lll4, lll5.

Essential Elements - a. In General.
"In order to constitute this kind of estoppel
there must exist a false representation or concealment of material facts; it must have been
made with knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the facts; the party to whom it was made
must have been without knowledge or the means
of knowledge of the real facts; it must have been
made with the intention that it should be acted
upon; and the party to whom it was made must
have relied on or acted upon it to his prejudice.
To constitute an 'estoppel in pais' there must
concur an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterward asserted, action
by the other party thereon and injury to such
other party. There can be no estoppel if either
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of these elements are wanting. They are each of
equal importance. 21 Corpus Juris, pp. II9,
ll20. See also, Pomeroy' s Equity Jurisprudence
(4th Ed.) p. IU44; lligelow on Estoppel (6th
Ed.) pp. 603 ,604."
"It is essenial therefore that the representation, whether it arises by words, acts or conduct,
must have been of a material fact; that it must
have been willfully intended to lead the party
setting up the estoppel to act upon it or that
there must have been reasonable grounds and
cause to think that because thereof he would
change his position to do some act or take some
course on faith in the conduct, and that such
action results to his detriment if the person
sought to be estopped may now repudiate the
words or interpretation placed upon such conduct. This does not require an actual intent to
defraud but only that the circumstances and
conduct were such as would perpetrate a fraud
or unfair advantage if the party could now deny
what he had induced or suffered another to believe and act upon."

Although there are a number of Utah cases relating
to estoppel, none have been found which are specifically in point regarding estoppel in brokerage cases.
However, that the doctrine of estoppel is recognized
in Utah is borne out by the case of Tanner vs. Provo
Reservoir Company, 99 Utah 158, 103 P 2d 134
( 1940) , where the question of estoppel was raised by
the Defendant against the Plaintiff where the Plaintiff
had consulted and advised the Defendant in a prior
suit regarding the adjudication of water rights, but
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had not revealed that he himself held a claim that related
to that prior suit. The Court held that the Plaintiff
was estopped and said as follows:
"Plaintiff is estopped to challenge the decree,
not only because he is bound by reason of his
Dixon holdings, but because he failed to disclose
his claims when defendant was relying upon him
and paying him compensation to do so."
Estoppel is also recognized as being applicable in
Utah in Farmers and Merchants Bank vs. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P 2d
1045 ( 1955), where the Court, quoting an Eighth Circuit case, said as follows in regard to equitable estoppel:
''Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the
notion that, when one person makes representations to another which warrant the latter in
acting in a given way, the one making such representations will not be permitted to change his
position when such change would bring about
inequitable consequences to the other person,
who relied on the representations and acted thereon in good faith * * * "
It should be noted that in this case there was not
estoppel based upon silence or inaction, but estoppel
based upon an affirmative action which is not entirely
the case at bar, but the case is cited for the purpose
of showing that equitable estoppel is a well-accepted
doctrine in Utah.
Another case which is somewhat analagous is
Migliaccio vs. Davis, 232 P2d 195, 120 Utah l (1951),
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wherein the Court set forth a quotation from 19 Am.
Jur., P 364, which is in substance the same as the quotation set forth above from 28 Am. Jnr. 2d in regard
to equitable estoppel and further noted at p. 199 that
where the person estopped carried on a course of silence
where he should have spoken which was calculated to
and did mislead the other party, that he was estopped
nmv to make a claim based upon the facts that he knew
at that time but did not disclose.
That inaction or silence may amount to both a misrepresentation and concealment upon which to base
estoppel is recognized in Utah Stat.e Building Com-

1ni.itsion 'l's. Great American Indemnity Company, 140
P2d 763, 105 Utah 11 ( 1943) where the Court said
as follows:
"It is true as stated by our court in the case
of Hilton vs. Sloan et al., 37 Utah 359 at page
373, 108 P. 689, at page 694. 'It is almost unnecessary to add that mere inaction or silence
may, under peculiar circumstances, amount to
both misrepresentation and concealment', which
may amount to an estoppel. This doctrine is
referred to and approved in the later case of
Tan~1er vs. Pro,·o Reservoir Company et al., 76
Utah 335, 298 P. 151.
"It is generaJly held that in order for silence
to work an estoppel, there must be a legal duty
to speak, or there must be something willful
or culpable in the silence which allows another
to place himself in an unfavorable position by
reason thereof. See Eltinge vs. Santos, 171 Cal.
278, 152 P. 915, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1143."
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That there was a duty to speak seems almost beyond
argument. For well over 23 months and perhaps for
as long as 25 or 26 months, the Appellant and his agent
\Villiamson, had no contact with Sears, Roebuck and
made no attempt to sell the property. For a period of
in excess of 23 months, a sign was on the property
holding it out for sale by others, and for at least 16
months of that period, if perhaps not the full period,
both \Villiamson and Appellant knew of the sign and
the contents thereof where another broker was listed
and yet neither did anything in relation to contacting
what they would have you believe was their most active
prospect as a purchaser, Sears, nor the seller, Federated, nor the new broker, \¥ allace-McConaughy. There
is no claim in the pleadings or the record that any of
the transactions and negotiations for the ultimate sale
which was made through \Vallace-McConaughy, were
ever conducted or carried on by the Appellant, or his
agent, \Villiamson, and yet during all that period of
time they remained silent, laying back, expecting that
they then could raise a claim for a commission that
they in fact had not earned. They had a positive duty
not only in the sense of good business practices as well
as good moral practices, but if, in fact, they were at
that time still agents of Federated for the purpose of
selling the property, they owed to Federated the highest
duty to speak as is said in 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Brokers,
Section 84 (p. 837):
"A broker is a fiduciary and holds a position
of trust and confidence. He is required to exer-
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cise ti<lelity and good faith toward his principal
in all matters within the scope of his employment
... he cannot put himself in a position antagonistic to his principal' s interest, by fraudulent
conduct, acting adversely to his client's interest,
or hy failing to communicate information he ma,IJ
possess or acquire which is or may be material
to his emplo,IJcr's advantage, or otherwise." (emphasis added) .
An<l it is the general rule that where a broker fails
to live up to the requirements placed upon him by the
principal-agent relationship, he is not entitled to a commission if any actually be earned, and in ad<lition
thereto, in some cases is held liable for damages. To
this effect see Reese vs. Harper, 8 Utah 2d ll9, 329
P ~d 410 ( 1958) where it is said as follows:
''Because of the specialized service the real
estate broker offers in acting as an agent for his
client there arises a fiduciary relationship between them; it is incumbent upon him to apply
his abilities and knowledge to the advantage of
the man he serves; and to make full disclosure
of all facts which his principal should know in
transacting the business. Failure to discharge
such duty with reasonable diligence and care precludes his recovery for the services he purports
to be rendering."
Appellant is on the horns of a dilemma in that if
he now claims that he was an agent of the Respondent
Federated at the time that he knew the property was
being held for sale by others and saw the building being
demolished and failed to speak, then in addition to
being es topped by his inaction, he is further preYented
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from recovering any comnuss10n, by reason of the
breach of his fiduciary responsibility to his principal.
And yet, on the other hand, if he claims he did not
have such duty at the time, he has no ground upon
which to claim any commission, because if he was not
an agent of Federated at the time he had no further
right to deal with the property and thus no right to
commission.
In Appellant's Point III it is argued simply that
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not applicable in
this case because the Respondent had full knowledge
of the facts known to the Appellant. However, the
Appellant simply fails to see the point made. It is
admitted by the Appellant that a formal effort to terminate any rights that Appellant may have had under
the contract was made, and this is admitted in the pleadings and in the Appellant's brief. But the uncontroverted
affidavit of D. Howe .Moffat states that had he known
that the Appellant would have claimed a commission
upon the sale to Sears, additional action would have
been taken to terminate any rights by 'Villiamson or
the sale would not have been made. (R-38-39) The
fact that was not disclosed which Williamson and Limb
had in their knowledge was that they still contended
that they had a commission coming if a sale to Sears
was made.
In view of the demolition of the building which,
accor<ling to 'Villiamson and Limb would have changed
the value of the property, and the huge sign placed on
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the property holding it out for sale by another broker,
it would appear obvious that a person claiming to be
the agent of the owner of the property would have
made some contact with him to determine the current
status of the property.
The Appellant stresses in his brief that the sign
di<l not specifically make overtures to Sears or anyone
else, but it would also seem obvious that the sign being
placed on the property and holding the same out for
sale and being directly across the street from SearsUoebuck did not limit its overtures to persons other
than Sears and as noted in the herein, the duty to speak
on behalf of someone claiming to be an agent is much
greater and much more compelling than the ordinary
duty to speak in an estoppel situation.
The Appellant in his brief simply ignores the fiduciary responsibility that he must bear toward his principal if he is to claim a commission under any kind
of an arrangement and only argues that he is not
estopped because the knowledge that he should have
revealed was also within the knowledge of the respondent. However, the authorities he cites do not involve
the fiduciary relationship. The authorities that he
relies upon in relation to his argument of the inapplicability of the doctrine of estoppel relates to the ordinary situation of two parties dealing at arms' length
and not a relationship based upon a fiduciary responsibility caused by the principal-agent relationship.
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As pointed out herein, the Appellant is in the
position of:
(I) Claiming that he was in fact the agent of the

defendants at the time of said sale so that he can
claim a commission, but is not entitled to the commission because of his failure to carry out his fiduciary responsibility in relation to disclosures that
he should have made to the principal; or
( 2) In the position of admitting that he was not

an agent at that time and thus has no right to a
commission.
Under either set of facts it is respectfully submitted that the Respondents are entitled to Summary
Judgment as granted below dismissing Appellant's
complaint.

POINT III: THE RELIEF REQUESTED
BY THE APPELLANT CANNOT BE GRANTED BECAUSE ALL OF THE DEFENSES OF
RESPONDENT HAVE NOT BEEN RULED
UPON.
The Appellant, in his brief, argues that the trial
court erred in not granting his Motion for Summary
Judgment but fails to argue that the court also erred
in granting the Respondents' Motion for Summary
Judgment. It would thus appear that the Appellant
is simply saying that he should have Summary Judgment but that it is ~II right for the Respondents to have
Summary Judgment also. This, obviously, cannot be
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the case and so it is presumed by Respondents that the
Appellant, in his Point I, is really arguing that Summary .J udgme11t should have been granted for Appellant
and that the Summary Judgment granted the Respondents should be reversed. This court is in no position
to grant the relief asked by the Appellant for the reason
that all of the defenses of the Respondents have not
been ruled upon. The Respondents, in their answer,
hm·e a second affirmative defense and plead that the
letter of October 25, 1963, upon which the Appellant
sued is so vague as to be unenforceable. The Respondents also have raised the defense of an oral recision.
The l\lotion for Summary Judgment did not
consider these defenses and they obviously cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal but for that very
reason, if the court fails to sustain the judgment below,
the only relief that can be awarded to the Appellant
would be to remand the case for trial so that the Respondents will have the opportunity of proving the
defenses that have not been argued heretofore, as well
as attempting to prove the other defenses which the
court below found to be valid as a matter of law based
upon the undisputed facts.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully urged that this court should sustain the judgment awarded below for the following
reasons:
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1. There was no performance of the obligation

to procure a ready, willing and able buyer within
a reasonable time nor, in fact, any activity or negotiation by the Appellant that had any effect at all
upon the ultimate purchase of the property by
Sears-Roebuck and Company and anything that
Appellant, in fact, did was not within a reasonable
time and the authority granted by the letter of
October 23, 1963, and any obligation thereunder
became terminated by the passage of time and by
action of law :
2. There was no consideration for the letter of
October 25, 1963, as it was a unilateral contract

and the consideration was to have been performance by the Appellant, which admittedly was not
done;
3. The Appellant is estopped on any one of at least

three grounds from claiming any commission, towit:
A. Estoppel by silence or inaction.
B. Estoppel by negligence.
C. Estoppel by breach of his fiduciary relationship because of his silence or inaction.
4. Appellant is not entitled to Summary J udg-

ment in addition to all the foregoing because of
the fact that all of Respondents' defenses have not
been ruled upon and a ruling on all of said defenses cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
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It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
llespectfully submited,
MOFFAT, IVERSON and TAYLOR

1311 \Valker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
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